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Armen Khatchatourov [COSTECH] 
John Stewart [COSTECH] 
Lived world is a term of central import-
ance for understanding human action, includ-
ing the case of (computer) mediated action. 
Lived world is a rather clumsy English 
rendering of the German Umwelt. The term is 
used by Husserl (and in phenomenology in 
general; see Merleau-Ponty and the French 
monde propre) to designate the world as it 
exists from the point of view of the perceiv-
ing subject, after the exercise of phenomeno-
logical reduction. What is enacted or brought 
forth by a human subject is a world of lived 
experience, world as a world of possibilities, 
of things and situations which makes sense 
for the subject, and not the objective and 
neutral world as-it-is. 
The term was also employed by the Ger-
man ethologist von Uexküll to designate the 
world as experienced by this or that species 
of animal. A famous example is the world of 
the tick. Even though it is blind, deaf and 
dumb (and can only crawl slowly), the tick 
nevertheless succeeds in the remarkable feat 
of identifying a warm-blooded mammal, 
catching it and feeding by sucking its blood. 
To do this, tick uses just 3 bits of informa-
tion, which von Uexküll identified experi-
mentally in a laboratory setting: 
- Butyric acid / or not. If there is, the tick 
lets itself fall from its perch on the twig of 
a bush. 
- Hairy / smooth surface. If the surface is 
hairy, the tick crawls until it finds a smooth 
surface i.e. bare skin; it then pierces the 
surface with its head. 
- Liquid at 37+2°C / or not. If yes, the tick 
will suck the liquid. 
The concatenation of these three percep-
tion-action cycles, in ecological context, 
enables the tick to find a mammal. The lived 
world of the tick is thus remarkably impover-
ished, containing just three beacons; but this 
minimalist simplicity conditions robustness 
of the actions, and robustness is more im-
portant than richness. 
It is interesting to note that the Gestalt 
psychologists (largely inspired by phenomen-
ology) made a similar effort to avoid the 
error of the stimulus – the error in question 
consisting of attributing perceptual experi-
ence to the perceived objects, to the detri-
ment of describing the actual subjective 
experience as such. 
There is a similar distinction between body 
and lived body: on the one hand, the biologi-
cal body as a physical object (Körper), on the 
other hand the lived body as the seat of 
subjective experience (lived body is a rather 
clumsy English rendering of the German 
Leib, French corps propre or chair). The inter-
play between these two radically inseparable 
facets of the body leads to the theme of 
embodiment. 
Let us consider the situation called tactile 
chiasmus, when one explores by touch his 
left hand with his right hand. In that case, the 
subject feels his left hand from the inside, as 
being touched. However, at the same time, 
for the right hand, the left hand is also an 
object of the world, that is considered as any 
other object. The notion of lived body is 
closely related to the kinaesthesia, under-
stood as the very locus of inhabiting the body 
and feeling it from the inside. 
Finally these notions should be under-
stood, strictly speaking, in the light of the 
specific phenomenological methodology 
which is called phenomenological reduction. 
The basic method is that of phenomenologi-
cal reduction or Epokhè. Phenomenological 
reduction consists in putting into parentheses 
the naïve thesis of the existence of the exter-
nal world; and in neutralizing belief in the 
existence (or indeed the non-existence) of 
objects in the world. This is methodologically 
necessary in order to focus attention on the 
mode of appearance of objects, and hence to 
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define the way objects appear to the con-
sciousness (or the modalities of their coming 
into presence). It is important not to confuse 
phenomenological reduction with introspec-
tion, with a restriction or limitation, nor with 
reductionism as it is be practised in the con-
text of scientific enquiry. 
Phenomenological reduction leads to the 
discovery of the intentional structure of 
consciousness. While maintaining the Kant-
ian insistence on the transcendental level, 
Husserl put emphasis on the concept of 
phenomenon (i.e. what appears to the con-
sciousness, and the way it appears to the 
consciousness, and this independently from 
the real existence of the object). He then 
redefines consciousness in terms of inten-
tionality. Consciousness is no longer a think-
ing substance (res cogitans), but rather a 
dynamic action whereby (the subject) aims at 
(something). 
Phenomenology thus introduces a double 
shift from classical approaches to the ques-
tion of knowledge: 
- On the one hand, phenomenology seeks to 
account not for the object that appears to 
the consciousness, but for the way in 
which the object appears. This process of 
appearing supposes that there is an a priori 
correlation between consciousness and its 
objects; experience – and hence knowledge 
– only exists for (a subject of conscious-
ness); conversely, consciousness is always 
consciousness of (something). 
- On the other hand, contrary to Kant for 
whom the a priori categories of experience 
(space and time) are purely formal catego-
ries, phenomenology seeks to describe up 
to the cognitive categories as arising from 
the flow of the lived experience. These 
ideas, though related to the transcendental 
tradition, renews it radically; the notion of 
lived experience (Erlebnis), which is the 
centre of gravity of phenomenology, im-
plies that knowledge and consciousness is 
not possible without a grounding in em-
bodiment. 
Through this thematisation of lived body 
and embodiment, phenomenology leads thus 
to a reconceptualization of consciousness, 
which is then understood as an activity of the 
subject which enacts the lived world. Al-
though the concept of enaction was intro-
duced by Varela and Maturana, it is largely 
inspired by – and grounded on - phenomen-
ology. 
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